The spheres of influence of Mexican cartels in the USA

 Other, Updates to Geo-Mexico  5 Responses »
May 192016
 

An unclassified DEA Intelligence Report from a year ago has just resurfaced on my desk. Entitled United States: Areas of Influence of Major Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations, it includes two particularly interesting maps.

The report states that “Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) pose the greatest criminal drug threat to the United States; no other group is currently positioned to challenge them. These Mexican poly-drug organizations traffic heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana throughout the United States, using established transportation routes and distribution networks. They control drug trafficking across the Southwest Border and are moving to expand their share, particularly in the heroin and methamphetamine markets.”

As of May 2015, the DEA identified the following cartels that operate cells within the USA: the Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Juarez Cartel, Knights Templar (Los Caballeros Templarios or LCT), Beltran-Leyva Organization (BLO), Jalisco New Generation Cartel (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion or CJNG), Los Zetas, and Las Moicas.

The maps reflect “data from the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) program to depict the areas of influence in the United States for major Mexican cartels.”

DEA-Mexican cartel influence in USA

DEA-Mexican cartel influence in USA

Figure 1 (click map to enlarge) shows the distribution of DEA Field Offices. The pie chart for each office shows “the percentage of cases attributed to specific Mexican cartels in an individual DEA office area of responsibility”.

“Since 2014, the Arellano-Felix Organization, LCT, and the Michoacán Family (La Familia Michoacán LFM) cartels have been severely disrupted, which subsequently led to the development of splinter groups, such as, “La Empresa Nueva” (New Business) and “Cartel Independiente de Michoacan” (Independent Cartel of Michoacan) representing the remnants of these organizations.”

Figure 2 (below) shows the dominant transnational criminal organization (TCO) in each domestic DEA Field Division, relative to other active TCOs in the same geographic territory. The map includes population density shading which “is intended to depict potential high density drug markets that TCOs will look to exploit through the street-level drug distribution activities of urban organized crime groups/street gangs.”

DEA-Mexican cartel influence in USA

DEA-Mexican cartel influence in USA

“The Sinaloa Cartel maintains the most significant presence in the United States. They are the dominant TCO along the West Coast, through the Midwest, and into the Northeast. While CJNG’s presence appears limited to the West Coast, it is a cartel of significant concern, as it is quickly becoming one of the most powerful organizations in Mexico, and DEA projects its presence to grow in the United States over the next year. In contrast, Mexican cartels such as the Gulf, Juarez, and Los Zetas hold more significant influence closer to the Southwest Border, but as shown on the map, their operational capacity decreases with distance from the border.”

Other, smaller, “splinter groups from the disrupted LCT organization continue to traffic drugs from the Michoacán, Mexico area into the United States. The BLO, former transportation experts for the Sinaloa Cartel, is most active along the East Coast and is also responsible for the majority of heroin in the DEA Denver area of responsibility. Las Moicas is a Michoacán-based organization with former LFM links, but remains a regional supplier in California and operate on a smaller scale relative to other major Mexican TCOs.”

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Drug cartels taking over the tortilla industry in Guerrero

 Mexico's geography in the Press  1 Response »
Mar 282016
 

In 2014 there were 285 tortillerias in Chilpancingo, the capital of the state of Guerrero, when the troubles with the drug cartels really started. Now only 185 remain open as a result of drug gangs attacking the tortilla shops and workers, kidnapping owners and forcing others out of business out of fear of the violence.

Chilpancingo, with a population of over 280,000, is situated in the mountains 105 km north-east of Acapulco. As elsewhere, the tortilla shops are concentrated in the poorer barrios where local criminal gangs also tend to be located. Tortillas are sold from small shops with a view to the street, or are delivered door-to-door by young men on motor cycles.

The drug cartels in Chilpancingo, such as Los Rojos and Guerreros Unidos, realized that by controlling the business owners and the employees of tortillerias, they would have a wide-spread and well-placed network of drug distribution points, lookouts and street dealers, operating under the guise of these many small legitimate businesses.

tortilleria

The take-over began in 2014 with the kidnapping of shop owners and workers, often involving a week’s captivity in a secure house, and demands for ransom ranging from 30,000 pesos (US$2100), up to 2 million pesos (US$140,000 for owners of multiple tortillerias.) After release, the victims were forced to co-operate with the cartel’s drug distribution and look-out system, under threat of business closure. The leader of the Chilpancingo tortilla sellers, Abdon Abel Hernandez has been threatened numerous times, kidnapped once, and his family had to borrow a million pesos to secure his release. He says about 35% of the local tortilla industry has shut down since 2014 out of fear.

The regional president of Corpamex (Mexican Confederation of Business Owners) Adrian Alarcon says he also lives with the fear of death for trying to defend his threatened union membership. “Today the tortilla industry is kidnapped by them (criminal groups) just like what happened with public transport when they forced taxi drivers and bus drivers to become the hands and eyes of the narco. The industry is completely infiltrated. The money that comes from the tortillas is used to buy weapons. We are financing them”.

January 2016 march by owners of tortillerias asking for state government help

January 2016 march by owners of tortillerias asking for state government help

He also stated that 36 businessmen were kidnapped and tortured in the central region of Guerrero in the first two months of 2016, with most of the victims being associated with the tortilla industry. “It wasn’t a coincidence”, he said, “that a national survey named Chilpancingo as the country’s worst city to live in. Crime has put an end to everything: investments, jobs, and the desire to make a family here. But if you think the situation here is in a critical state, you should go to Acapulco. Here, the tortilleros are kidnapped, but there they are being killed.” According to Arcadio Castro, leader of the Tortilla Association of Guerrero, 20 tortilla workers lost their lives in 2015 in clashes with organized crime.

The previous chief of police of Acapulco was dismissed after he failed to pass control examinations, known as trust tests, designed to identify those with possible links to organized crime. His replacement expects some 700 of his current force of 1901 municipal police will also fail their next control exams. Given his current budget, he has no hope of renovating his police force with younger, healthier, law-abiding officers. The assault on the tortilla industry is generally not felt in the tourist areas of the city.

In 2010 UNESCO included the traditional Mexican cuisine of Michoacán in its list of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, in large part based on the multiple uses and cultural centrality of corn in Mexican traditional cooking. This decision was very publicly celebrated by the tortilla industry. Unhappily, today, the tortillerias of Guerrero are struggling to survive the extortion rackets of the local drug cartels.

Main source:

Oscar Balderas. Drug Cartels Are Taking Over the Tortilla Business in Mexico. VICE News, , 16 March 2016; article re-published in Business Insider.

Related posts:

The geography of Mexico’s drug trade: an index page

 Index page  1 Response »
Mar 032016
 

To make it easy to search for specific topics on Geo-Mexico, we add an occasional index page as a starting point for the best links relating to particular key topics. Note that the entire site can easily be searched via our search function, categories (right hand navigation bar on every page) and tags (left-hand navigation bar).

The geography of Mexico’s drug trade: an index page

The Basics

Economics:

Drug War Violence and Crime

Drug Money

Other

Index pages on other topics:

Ground-breaking mapping of Mexico’s drug war

 Mexico's geography in the Press  Comments Off on Ground-breaking mapping of Mexico’s drug war
Jul 022015
 

During the 2006-2012 federal administration, it was possible to map the incidence of crime across the country, with data readily available at both the state and the municipal level. The current administration of President Enrique Peña Nieto has diverted press attention away from the drugs-related violence, arguing that press coverage only serves to give more publicity to the bad guys. Unfortunately, that decision means that it has now become next to impossible to get regularly updated data for, or be able to map, the patterns of criminal activity.

This is one of the inevitable caveats that limits the future application of the ground-breaking methods (using data from 2007 to 2011), developed by Jesús Espinal, a quantitative analyst at the National Institute of Genomic Medicine in Mexico City,and Hernán Larralde, statistical physicist at the National University (UNAM). Their work is described in “Mapping Mexico’s deadly drug war“, Emiliano Rodríguez Mega’s recent article in Science magazine.

Mapping by Jesús Espinal Enríquez in Science magazine. Click to enlarge.

Mapping by Jesús Espinal Enríquez in Science magazine. Click to enlarge.

Essentially, they took official data for the location and date of all drug-related homicides in Mexico. They built a complex month-by-month network looking for temporal correlations in the homicide numbers between different cities. “If cities shared a death rate higher than 70 casualties per 100,000 inhabitants in a year and were less than 200 kilometers apart, Larralde and Espinal linked them together on their map to tease out broader geographical patterns.”

The results (summarized by the maps) are interesting. They show the rapid spatial spread of violence during the administration of Felipe Calderón as his government waged its war on drug cartels. The map for 2011 suggests that violence may have been finally becoming less widespread and becoming more focused on a relatively limited number of places.

Two major points are worth emphasizing. First (and as we have repeatedly pointed out in previous posts on this subject), the incidence of violent crime, including homicides, is certainly not similar across the entire country. Some states have much higher homicide rates than others; some municipalities have much higher rates than others. Some parts of the country, including several important tourist areas, have witnessed little or no drug-related violence.

Second, there is no evidence that the spread of violence between 2007 and 2011 occurred by continuous “contagious” diffusion (i.e. that it gradually spread from a single central point or a limited number of central points). The work of these authors supports the contention that the drugs-related activity in Mexico could, and did, increase simultaneously in cities far apart. This is only suggesting a coincidence in timing, and is certainly not proof of any causal connection. A small number of cities, such as Ciudad Juárez, Acapulco, Culiacán, Monterrey, Tampico and
Tijuana, appear as nodes in the network.

This approach may offer some help to policy makers as they consider alternative approaches to combating drugs-related violence, but, as the article makes clear, it does not necessarily mean that the best policy is to attack the cartels in the central hub cities. Aiming at the heart of a major cartel might reduce violence for a time, but could also lead to the formation of numerous smaller splinter groups with different ideals and methods. For example, after the leadership of the Gulf Cartel was dismantled in 2010, the cartel’s former enforcing arm, the Zetas took over, introducing a wave of more extreme violence.

Related posts:

Mexico more peaceful, but annual economic impact of violence still over two hundred billion dollars

 Books and resources, Mexico's geography in the Press  1 Response »
Apr 092015
 

The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) has published its Mexico Peace Index. The following excerpts come from the Executive Summary of the Mexico Peace Index Report 2015:

The Mexico Peace Index provides a comprehensive measure of peacefulness in Mexico from 2003 to 2014. The 2015 report aims to deepen the understanding of the trends, patterns and drivers of peace in Mexico while highlighting the important economic benefits that will flow from a more peaceful society.

Mexico Peace Index, 2015

Mexico Peace Index, 2015. Credit: Institute for Economics and Peace.

The map above shows the relative values of the MPI by state, where dark blue means the most peaceful states and dark red the least peaceful (most violent) states.

Improvement since 2012

According to the report, Mexico’s peace has improved 10.5% since 2012, continuing the trend from 2011; however, 2014 saw very little improvement, improving only 0.7%. It is too early to determine whether this is a new trend. Mexico’s level of peace in 2014 approached 2007 levels, when homicide and violent crime began to increase rapidly.

The MPI indicators registering the largest improvements in the last two years were the homicide rate, which fell by 30%, and the level of organized crime, which improved by 25%. All three measures in the organized crime indicator (extortion, kidnapping and narcotics offenses) improved. There was also a significant reduction in the violent crime rate, which fell by 12%.

Furthermore, the recorded increase in peacefulness was widespread. In the last two years, 26 out of the 32 states saw improvements in peacefulness, with all of them recording reductions in the violent crime rate and 23 states recording reductions in the homicide rate. The biggest improvements were recorded in the least peaceful states; contrary to the overall trend, the most peaceful states became slightly less peaceful. These diverging trends resulted in a substantial narrowing of the gap between the least peaceful and the most peaceful states.

In contrast, during the same two-year period, weapons crime increased significantly and was up by 11%. The three other indicators that make up the MPI (justice efficiency, incarceration and police funding) have plateaued or slightly deteriorated and are now at record highs.

The justice efficiency indicator continued to decline, which is very concerning, with the number of homicides relative to the number of prosecutions doubling from 1.45 in 2006 to 3.43 in 2013. The justice efficiency indicator measures the ratio of homicide convictions to homicides in a given year and is used as a proxy for impunity.

Additionally, the rate at which people were sentenced to prison fell from 210 per 100,000 people to 104 from 2003 to 2014. Combined with the deterioration in the justice efficiency indicator, this is a troubling trend that highlights the urgent need to fully implement the current justice reforms.

It should be noted that the declines in homicides and gang-related violence do not necessarily mean that criminal organizations are less powerful; they may have become more circumspect in their activities. This reflects a paradox in Mexico: while indicators of peacefulness have greatly improved in the last four years, many Mexicans still report high perceptions of criminality. Additionally, officially recorded rates of homicide and violent crime are still very high by global standards.

Under-reporting of violent crime and other criminal activities is a serious issue in Mexico, with IEP estimating that rape is reported only eight percent of the time and assault only 23%. To create a more accurate index, IEP has adjusted all indicators for under-reporting rates.

For many, these concerns create doubt about the reliability of criminal justice statistics. To determine the veracity of the official data, IEP compared various alternative datasets and victimization surveys against the official data. The results tend to support the trend towards higher levels of peace, but with some qualifications.

Main findings of the Mexico Peace Index 2015

  • Mexico has experienced a large decrease in violence since 2011, with the national level of peace improving by 16%.
  • Progress in peace plateaued last year; it is too early to determine if this is the start of a new trend.
  • The level of peace as measured by the 2015 MPI is still 18% lower than in 2003.
  • The most peaceful state in Mexico is Hidalgo, followed by Yucatán, Querétaro, Campeche, Tlaxcala and Chiapas.
  • Of the 76 largest metropolitan areas of Mexico, the most peaceful is Orizaba in Veracruz, and the least peaceful is Culiacán in Sinaloa.
  • The eastern region remains the most peaceful in Mexico, while the northern region is still the most violent, although the gap between the north and the other regions is now at its lowest point since 2004.

Trends in Peace

Peace improved in the majority of states in Mexico in the last two years, with 26 out of 32 states improving. The largest improvements were in the northern region, which improved 17.8%. The gap in the levels of peace between the least and most peaceful states is now at its lowest point since 2006.

Over the last two years, the largest decreases in violence have been in the homicide rate, which fell almost 30%, and the level of organized crime, which fell by 25%.

The only indicator that recorded a significant deterioration in the last two years is weapons crime, which increased by 11%. The police funding indicator and the justice efficiency indicator recorded very slight deteriorations, reaching their worst levels in 2014.

The fall in the homicide rate is mainly due to a reduction in homicides related to organized crime, as the biggest reductions were recorded in the states with the worst levels of drug cartel activity.

While there is some doubt about the accuracy of government crime statistics, multiple data sources do support a decline in the homicide rate over the last two years. This strongly suggests the progress in peace is real.

On an international comparison, Mexico fell 45 places in the Global Peace Index between 2008 and 2013. It remains the least peaceful country in Central America and the Caribbean.

Economic Value of Peace in Mexico

The total economic impact of violence in Mexico in 2014 is estimated to be $3 trillion pesos or US$233 billion, equivalent to 17.3% of GDP. This represents $24,844 pesos, or almost US$1,946, per citizen. This is a 16.7% decrease from 2012, when the total economic impact of violence in Mexico was $3.57 trillion pesos.

The states with the highest per capita economic impact from violence are Guerrero, Morelos, Baja California and Tamaulipas, with the economic impact in Guerrero at $43,666 pesos/person. If the 16 least peaceful states in 2003 had experienced the same economic growth as the 16 most peaceful states in 2003, then the Mexican economy in 2014 would be $140 billion pesos or 13% larger.

Related posts:

Which parts of Mexico have travel advisories?

 Other  2 Responses »
Jan 132015
 

At this time of year, Mexico attracts millions of visitors seeking to escape the cold weather further north. The vast majority of visitors will never experience any problem during their travels in Mexico, but both the US State Department and Canadian government continue to issue regular warnings to those considering travel in Mexico. Some of these warnings are specific to certain stretches of highway; others are broader and focus on cities or regions. Click below for the current US travel warnings related to Mexico.

  • Current US Travel Advisory for Mexico

The states left white on the map below all have advisories in effect (as of mid-January 2015) for most or all of the state in question. For the states shaded light green, only small parts of the state have advisories in place, while no advisories are currently in place for those states shaded dark green.

US Travel Advisory Areas, December 2014

US Travel Advisory Areas, December 2014: All states, other than those colored dark green, have travel advisories in place for at least part of the state

The Canadian government offers its own travel warnings for Mexico:

The Canadian advisories apply to all those states left white on the map below. States shaded dark green have no travel advisory in effect so far as the Canadian government is concerned.

Canadian Travel Advisory, November 2014. No advisory in effect for states colored dark green.

Canadian Travel Advisory, November 2014. No advisory in effect for states colored dark green.

The most obvious difference between the maps is that the US State Department is relatively unconcerned about the states of Jalisco and Nayarit, while the Canadian authorities have included them in a regional advisory.

States shaded dark green on both maps are areas where the US State Department and the Canadian government have no serious concerns about travel safety. These states, where travel is considered safe, include Guanajuato (including the cities of Guanajuato and San Miguel de Allende), Querétaro (including Querétaro City), Hidalgo, Puebla (including Puebla City), Oaxaca (Oaxaca City, Puerto Escondido and Huatulco), Chiapas (Tuxtla Gutiérrez and San Cristóbal de las Casas), Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatán (Mérida) and Quintana Roo (Cancún, Riviera Maya).

As always, tourists visiting Mexico and traveling within Mexico are advised to be cautious about visiting rural areas (especially in states where travel warnings are in place), to check local sources such as web forums for updates on the latest conditions, and to avoid driving at night.

Safe travels! Enjoy your trip!

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The abduction and presumed murder of 43 students in the state of Guerrero

 Mexico's geography in the Press  Comments Off on The abduction and presumed murder of 43 students in the state of Guerrero
Nov 182014
 

The disappearance several weeks ago, and presumed murder, of 43 students from a teachers’ college in Ayotzinapa in the state of Guerrero has shocked the nation and sent shock-waves around the world. The isolated mountainous parts of the state of Guerrero have long been home to some of the worst violence and most severe poverty in Mexico. The students went missing in the town of Iguala on 26 September 2014.

We appreciate that many of our readers will already be well informed about recent events, but hope that the following summary, with its links to English-language sources, will be useful.

Mexico’s attorney general has announced that a drug cartel, operating in tandem with the mayor of Iguala and the mayor’s wife, had kidnapped and killed the students, before burning their bodies beyond recognition and dumping the remains in plastic bags in a river. According to some versions, local police were not only aware of the events, but complicit in them.

mexico-kidnapping-horizontal-gallerySoon after the disappearance of the students, several mass graves were located on the outskirts of Iguala, but none of the remains has yet been positively identified as belonging to any of the missing students. However, the remains did include the body of a Roman Catholic priest from Uganda, missing since May 2014. John Ssenyondo, who had been serving in the region since 2010, was allegedly abducted by armed men for refusing to baptize the daughter of a suspected narco.

Earlier this month, security experts searching the landfill site near the town of Cocula (where gang members allegedly killed and burned the students) found rubbish bags with human remains. The charred remains have been sent to a specialized laboratory in Innsbruck, Austria, for testing, but results will not be known for several weeks.

A judge in Guerrero has since charged the city’s former mayor, Jose Luis Abarca, with being the mastermind behind the students’ disappearance, and of responsibility for the murder of six people killed in clashes between the trainees, police and masked gunmen on the night of 26 September 2014. The government has detained more than 70 people in connection with the disappearance of the students. Maria de los Angeles Piñeda, the wife of the local mayor is alleged to be the head of the area’s major drug cartel. Abarca and his wife have both been arrested. The small town of Iguala, site of the murders, installed a new mayor, Luis Mazon, after the incumbent was arrested for ordering the massacre, but he resigned in disgust after only a few hours in office, to be replaced by Silviano Mendiola.

Bloody demonstrations are taking place across the country, threatening tourism and denting the carefully-crafted public relations image of President Enrique Peña Nieto.

In Chilpancingo, the state capital of Guerrero, 600 protestors set fire to cars, a congressional office and the city hall.

The tourist resort of Acapulco has also been the scene of demonstrations. For a short time protestors prevented flights from taking off from the city’s airport, and have also blocked highways. The hotel occupancy rates plummeted to 20% for a time, before beginning to rise again in recent days.

In Mexico City, protestors set fire to one of the wooden doors of the Presidential Palace on the zocalo, Mexico City’s main square. The president has an office in the building but was leading a trade mission to China at the time.

Speaking to Fox News Latino recently, a student leader from the Ayotzinapa school said that, “It’s a national movement that’s launching. People are really upset in Mexico. It’s a movement for all citizens that is sparking protests across the country. That’s what happening now. We’re sending caravans to Chihuahua, Zacatecas, all the states from north to south. It’s family members [of the victims] and student-teachers.” The students also accept fire-bombings as a valid form of political expression.

Reactions in the USA have been mixed. For example, see:

The finances of Mexico’s Knights Templar drugs cartel

 Mexico's geography in the Press  Comments Off on The finances of Mexico’s Knights Templar drugs cartel
Feb 272014
 

A series of press reports over the past six months has shed interesting light on the variety of ways in which the Knights Templar cartel raises funding and manages its finances. The Knights Templar stronghold is the city of Apatzingan in Michoacán, but the cartel now operates in several states, including Guerrero.

Raising money:

1. Citrus and avocado production and exports

In January 2013, Alberto Galindo, spokesman for the Plan de Ayala National Movement, one of the largest organizations of Mexican farmers, claimed in a press interview that Mexico’s avocado farmers “have data that prove that 225 million pesos [17 million dollars] is the amount extorted by the drug cartels in Michoacán” each year. Citrus growers are also subject to regular extortion by the Knights Templar. We reported on avocado “protection money” back in 2012, and on the plight of citrus farmers in 2011.

2. Iron ore mining and exports

The Knights Templar levy “passage fees” on every ton of iron ore leaving mines in Michoacán for the port of Lázaro Cárdenas. In addition, they are alleged to have confiscated shipments of iron ore and then exported it themselves. They are also alleged to have funded illegal mining operations where iron ore is mined without the requisite environmental permits.

In response, the Mexican government has tightened the regulations for iron ore exports, which now require exporters to demonstrate that all ore being shipped has been mined legally. The main market for Michoacán iron ore is China. It is no coincidence that ore exports to China have quadrupled in the past 5 years. The federal government also ordered the military to take over the administration of the port of Lázaro Cárdenas to put an end to corrupt practices and sever this major source of funding for the Knights Templar.

The discussion related to cartel financing via iron ore exports has implicated several transnational firms who are said to have paid the Knights Templar to allow iron ore shipments from their mines to the port. Michoacán supplies about 25% of all the iron ore mined in Mexico, and about 1 million ha (almost 20% of the state) have been given in concession to transnational mining firms such as Mittal Steel, Ternium (Italy-Argenina), Minera del Norte (a subsidiary of AHMSA) and Pacific Coast Minerals.

Claims, such as those reported here and here, that Minera del Norte paid the Knights Templar $2 dollars/ton to move 10,000 tons of iron ore a week from its four mines in the Tepacaltepec region, have been categorically denied recently by the company’s Communications and Public Relations Director, Francisco Orduña Mangiola. In an e-mail to Geo-Mexico, Orduña writes that his company “has never paid any amount of money to criminals”. He points out that, “On the contrary, it was precisely our Company that denounced the illegal operations of criminal groups in iron ore deposits owned by our company and other companies in the area, from which those groups extracted iron ore that was subsequently exported illegally to China. It was reported to federal, state and military authorities… and this action ultimately resulted in the confiscation of large amounts of illegal minerals in the ports of Lázaro Cardenas and Manzanillo. It is important to say that our company does not export iron ore, and that the lump iron ore extracted in mines located in the Pacific Coast is sent by railway directly to Monclova, Coahuila, and used as a raw material in our steel facilities.”

3. Port traffic and operations

A levy of up to 10% on goods passing through the port of Lázaro Cárdenas.

4. Miscellaneous money laundering activities

Purchase and sale of property, vehicles, cattle, textiles (imported from China and sold in Guanajuato after being relabelled with major brand names), truck tires, etc.

5. Extortion payments

Extortion payments received from truck drivers, gas stations, grocery stores, bars, restaurants, pharmacies, car lots, and even direct from municipalities (in exchange for “permitting” municipal works related to drainage, street lighting, paving). The rise of self defense groups was partially due to citizens’ outrage at the various extortion payments demanded by the Knights Templar.

6. Shipments and sales of drugs (as far away as California and Texas), many of them supplied via the port of Lázaro Cárdenas.

Summary of Knights Templar income from illegal activities [dollars a month]

  • drugs, weapons, kidnapping, pirated items, vehicle thefts, etc: $2.8 million
  • extortion rackets, $1 million
  • extortion of municipalities, $1.1 million
  • investments in real estate, vehicles, textiles, electronic items, etc., $1.3 million

The port of Lázaro Cárdenas was key to the Knights Templar financial plans, and effectively served as the cartel’s “gigantic central bank”, capable of supplying an endless stream of funds to the cartel. It remains to be seen how effectively the government decision to put the military in charge of administering the port will destroy the ability of the Knights Templar to raise funds to support their illegal activities.

Where does all this money go?

Part of it goes on bribing officials. According to an investigation published in Milenio, a national daily, the Knights Templar cartel is believed to spend $2 million a month in bribing officials in the state of Michoacán, and a further $400,000 a month in other states. The Milenio articles were based on an official intelligence report that their journalists were given access to for a few hours.

Sample payments made to officials range from up to $26,000 a month to a federal police commander in an important city to $19,000 a month to officials in the prosecutor’s office and $18,000 a month to a state police commander. Officials in smaller cities and local administrations are paid less.

Recipients of drug cartel money also include journalists, with some print journalists receiving $3,000 a month and payments of about $2000 a month to a TV executive.

Related posts (chronological order):

Mexico’s drug cartels and their areas of operation, a 2014 update

 Mexico's geography in the Press, Updates to Geo-Mexico  Comments Off on Mexico’s drug cartels and their areas of operation, a 2014 update
Feb 172014
 

As noted in previous updates on Mexico’s drug cartels and their shifting areas (and methods) of operation, it is becoming ever harder to keep up-to-date with the geography of drug cartel territories. The current federal administration has deliberately limited the amount of hard data relating to drug violence published on government sites or in Mexico’s mainstream press. While this may help to reduce public unease at the levels of drug-related crime, it also means that it has become much harder to analyse the situation and determine overall patterns and trends.

The 2013 UN Global Report on Drugs estimates that Mexico is Latin America`s largest drugs producer, making 30 times more heroin than Colombia. The report also cites statistics showing that more methamphetamine are confiscated in Mexico than in the rest of the world combined.

Previous updates:

The main players  (February 2014) are:

  1. Los Zetas, operating in more than half of Mexico’s 32 states (more territory than their main rivals the Sinaloa Federation), and prone to extreme violence. They have branched out into human trafficking and extortion to support their drug smuggling operations. They control much of eastern Mexico. Even the capture of their top leader in 2013 does not appear to have significantly weakened their internal cohesion.
  2. Sinaloa Federation, which remains in control of most of western Mexico, and increasingly specializes in the production of methamphetamine. The cartel is led by Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, whose estimated personal net worth exceeds $1 billion dollars according to Forbes magazine. Guzmán escaped from a high secrutiy jail in 2003 but was recaptured in Mazatlán in February 2014.
  3. Gulf Cartel, still important along Mexico’s Gulf coast, but weakened due to infighting, captures of leaders, and conflicts with Los Zetas.
  4. Knights Templar (Los Caballeros Templarios), started in 2010 by former members of The Michoacán Family (La Familia Michoacana), and which now controls much of the drug-related activity in Michoacán and Guerrero. They are in near-constant conflict with the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (based in the neighboring state of Jalisco) which has resulted in continued violence along the Jalisco-Michoacán border.

Smaller, regional players:

  1. Tijuana Cartel, operating in the city of Tijuana on the Baja California/California border.
  2. Juárez Cartel, now largely limited to Cd. Juárez and the border with Texas. Mexican federal police say this group now calls itself the New Juárez Cartel (Nuevo Cartel de Juárez).
  3. Jalisco New Generation Cartel (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación), based in the state of Jalisco and thought to operate as enforcers for the Sinaloa Federation
  4. Cartel del Pacífico Sur; weak, and competing with Zetas, mainly in the central Mexico state of Guerrero
  5. Independent Cartel of Acapulco, small and apparently declining in importance

Splinter groups (see below):

  1. Sangre Z
  2. Golfo Nueva Generación
  3. La Corona
Cartel areas and drug routes in Mexico

Cartel areas and drug routes in Mexico, 2012. Copyright Stratfor. Click map for enlarged version

Recent changes (2013-2014)

Early in 2013, Mexico’s National Security Cabinet revealed the emergence of several new drug trafficking organizations. The new groups–Sangre Z, Golfo Nueva Generación, and La Corona– are splinter groups from Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel, and the Sinaloa Federation respectively. The new groups formed in response to the arrest of key operatives in the large cartels. These new groups are reported to be well equipped and well-armed, generating revenue through drug trafficking and by levying protection payments on other drug traffickers who pass through their turf on their way to the USA..

In 2013, the situation in the western state of Michoacán became particularly unstable with drug-related violence (shootouts, roadblocks and the torchings of vehicles) perpetrated by the Knights Templar in many parts of the state. The town of Apatzingan in the Tierra Caliente region of Michoacán is the main bastion of the Knights Templar organization. The increased violence resulted in the well-publicized rise of civilian “vigilante” militia groups (community self-defense groups), prepared to take on cartel members in direct combat in their efforts to reduce the incidence of extortion, kidnappings and other crimes. Self-defense groups sprang up in more than 30 municipalities in Michoacán including at least 15 of the state’s 113 cities. Places with self-defense groups included Buenavista Tomatlan, Coalcoman, Tepalcatepec, Los Reyes, Aquila, Paracho, Cheran, Tancitaro, Paracuaro and Nueva Italia.

For a good summary account of the struggle between the Knights Templar and the vigilantes, see Mexican Vigilantes Beat Back Ruthless Knights Templar Cartel by journalist Ioan Grillo. We will take a closer look at the Knights Templar in a future post.

In recent months, in the wake of drug gang attacks on gas stations and electricity facilities in Michoacán, the federal government has stepped up its attempts to resolve the security problems in the state. In some places, it has replaced city officials and local police forces en masse. In the important Pacific Coast port of Lázaro Cárdenas (a main port of entry for the chemicals used for methamphetamine production, and a main export port for minerals, one of the more lucrative sources of income for the Knights Templar), the federal government sent in the military to administer the port.

In their efforts to curb the rise of civilian militia groups, the federal and state governments have announced a scheme which allows militia members to register to join new, state-controlled Rural Protection Forces (RPF). As of early February 2014, about 500 “self-defense” members had already registered to join the RPF.

The federal government has also announced the creation of a 3.5-billion-dollar purse to support 250 specific actions in Michoacán designed to reactivate the state’s economy, reinforce security and aid its social assistance programs.

Related posts (chronological order):

The pattern of violent crimes in Mexico in 2013

 Mexico's geography in the Press, Updates to Geo-Mexico  Comments Off on The pattern of violent crimes in Mexico in 2013
Feb 082014
 

The Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y la Justicia Penal AC, a Mexican non-profit, has published an interesting report looking at the levels of violent crime in Mexico in 2013:

The authors take violent crimes to include intentional homicide, kidnapping, rape, aggravated assault, robbery with violence and extortion.

At the municipal level, violent crime is concentrated in a relatively small number of municipalities. The report looks at the statistics for the 216 municipalities (including delegaciones of the Federal District) that had estimated populations of over 100,000 in 2013. Since 2012, four municipalities have joined this group: El Fuerte (Sinaloa), Tepotzotlán (México), Pánuco (Veracruz) y Playas de Rosarito (Baja California). Between them, the 216 municipalities are home to about 64% of Mexico’s total population.

Data from government agencies and INEGI were used to compile rates for each crime in each municipality. These rates were then multiplied by the following weightings (to reflect the relative severity and impacts of each type of crime),

  • 0.55 for intentional homicide
  • 0.22 for kidnapping
  • 0.13 for rape
  • 0.04 for aggravated assault
  • 0.03 for robbery with violence
  • 0.03 for extortion

and summed to give an overall index for “violent crimes”.  For the 231 municipalities, the index ranged from 106.63 for Oaxaca, Oaxaca to 0.00 for Zapotlán el Grande in Jalisco. The full details of the methodology are explained and discussed in the report. A similar methodology was also used to calculate levels of violence by state.

The worst 10 municipalities in terms of violent crime were:

  1. Oaxaca, Oaxaca – violent crime index value of 106.63
  2. Acapulco, Guerrero – 80.35
  3. Cuernavaca, Morelos – 65.30
  4. Yautepec, Morelos – 56.19
  5. San Pedro, Coahuila – 53.42
  6. Cd. Victoria, Tamaulipas – 52.48
  7. Iguala de la Independencia, Guerrero – 52.25
  8. El Fuerte, Sinaloa – 50.82
  9. Jiutepec, Morelos – 50.29
  10. Torreón, Coahuila – 49.31

The national index (ie treating the entire country as a single entity) was 23.17, meaning that the index value for violent crimes in Oaxaca, Oaxaca, was more than four times that of the country as a whole.

Municipalities which were in the worst twenty in 2012 for violent crime, but have now fallen out of that group include: Lerdo (Durango) Zacatecas (Zacatecas), Cuautla (Morelos), Zihuatanejo (Guerrero), Temixco (Morelos), Cuauhtémoc (DF), Tecomán (Colima), Navolato (Sinaloa), Centro (Tabasco) and Monterrey (Nuevo León).

Moving into the worst twenty for the first time are: Playas de Rosarito (Baja California), Hidalgo del Parral (Chihuahua) San Pedro (Coahuila), Chilpancingo (Guerrero), El Fuerte (Sinaloa) and Chalco, Cuautitlán, Cuautitlán Izcalli, Ecatepec and Naucalpan (all in the State of Mexico).

Of the 213 municipalities, Acapulco had the highest intentional homicide rate (112.81/100,000, about 6 times the national rate of 19.05/100,000). Cd Victoria had the highest kidnapping rate (23.28/100,000, 15 times higher than the national rate of 1.46/100,000, though kidnapping rates in Mexico are notoriously unreliable, and have been the subject of intense press debate in recent months).

Violent crimes by state, 2013

By state (see map), Guerrero had the highest violent crime index with 47.76 points, followed by Morelos 43.99 and Chihuahua 40.87. In general, with the prominent exceptions of the State of México and Guerrero, the southern half of Mexico appears to be somewhat safer than the northern half.

Map of Violent crime index, 2013

Violent crime index, 2013. Source of data: see post. Credit: Geo-Mexico

For individual categories of crime at the state scale, Morelos had the highest kidnapping rate (8.24/100,000). Quintana Roo had the highest rate of rape (28.31/100,000, compared to national average of 11.36/100,000). The State of Mexico had the highest rate for aggravated assault (251.64/100,000 compared to national average of 130.21/100,000). Morelos came out on top for the highest rate of robbery with violence (455.08/100,000 compared to national average of 182.61) and for the highest rate of extortion (21.96/100,000 compared to national average of 6.94/100,000).

Good news for tourists

According to this report, almost all of Mexico’s major tourist destinations (with the noteworthy exception of Acapulco) are located in areas where violent crime is below the national average.

Related posts:

Incarceration in Mexico: distance decay from California?

 Mexico's geography in the Press  Comments Off on Incarceration in Mexico: distance decay from California?
Jan 072014
 

In a previous post – 2013 Mexico Peace Index: Mexico becoming more peaceful –we reported the work of the Institute for Economics and Peace in devising its inaugural 2013 Mexico Peace Index (MPI).

The interactive online maps that form part of this report repay some exploring. In addition to allowing you to view the pattern for MPI on a state-by-state basis, they also allow you to see the pattern for each of the 7 main indicators:

  • Homicide (includes murder, infanticide and non-negligent manslaughter)
  • Violent crime (includes rape, robbery and aggravated assault)
  • Weapons crime (the proportion of crimes that involve a firearm)
  • Incarceration (the annual number of people per 100,000 people over the age of 18 sentenced to prison)
  • Police funding (proportion of the Federal District Public Security Contribution Fund)
  • Organized crime (includes extortion, kidnapping, and drug related crimes)
  • Justice efficiency (the ratio of sentenced homicides to total number of homicides)

Looking at these maps recently, one curiosity that struck me was that the map for incarceration rates shows a clear distance-decay pattern (the kind of pattern we older geographers love to find, even if we can’t explain it!).

The map is a screenshot of incarceration rates in 2012. The incarceration rate is defined as the number of people /100,000 people over the age of 18 sentenced to prison in that year.

Incarceration rate in Mexico, 2012

Incarceration rate in Mexico, 2012. Credit: Mexican Peace Index. Institute for Economics & Peace

In this case (see map), it appears that the rate of incarceration varies with distance from the US state of California. The closer to California, the higher the incarceration rate. Looking more closely, it becomes apparent that the states along the northwest coast of Mexico, west of the Western Sierra Madre, have higher incarceration rates than those inland or further south. This means that a better description of the pattern might be that states that are closer in travel time, or ease of travel, to California have higher incarceration rates. This has the added attraction of bringing the eastern state of Quintana Roo into the picture given the large number of flights from Los Angeles to Cancún!

Even if a pattern exists, this kind of conjectural analysis is not the same as a causal explanation. In this case, surely it is just a coincidence that incarceration rates happened to arrange themselves like this? Perhaps the analysis of incarceration rates in future years will shed more light on this spatial curiosity!

For other examples of distance decay, see

The full 96-page 2013 Mexico Peace Index report – available here – is well worth reading and offers many more insights into the changes taking place in Mexico.

Related posts:

2013 Mexico Peace Index: Mexico becoming more peaceful

 Mexico's geography in the Press  Comments Off on 2013 Mexico Peace Index: Mexico becoming more peaceful
Dec 142013
 

The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), an independent, non-profit research organization dedicated to promoting a better understanding of the social and economic factors that develop a more peaceful society, has released its first Mexico Peace Index. The 2013 Mexico Peace Index (MPI) is based on a similar methodology as previous IEP indices, including the United States Peace Index and the United Kingdom Peace Index; however specific measures were included to better reflect the specific Mexican cultural and national context.

For the Mexico Peace Index, seven indicators were used to analyze peace: homicide rates, violent crime, weapons crime, incarceration, police funding, efficiency of the justice system, and the level of organized crime.

The study was performed with the guidance of an Expert Panel representing various institutions such as IMCO, CIDE, Mexico Evalua and INEGI. The Mexico Peace Index 2013 uses data provided by INEGI and the Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System (SESNSP).

Mexico Peace Index

Mexico Peace Index. Credit: Institute for Economics and Peace.

The headlines

  • Mexico Peace Index finds that peace improved 7.4% in past two years
  • The two-year improvement in peace was primarily driven by a 30% decrease in organized crime
  • Most peaceful states experienced an annual GDP growth of more than double the least peaceful states
  • Oaxaca, Chiapas, and Yucatan have the most improved levels of peace in the past decade
  • Mexico has the greatest potential in the world to overcome its current levels of violence and build a more peaceful society, with a strong business environment and high levels of human capital
  • The eastern region of Mexico is the most peaceful; the northern region the least

The 2013 MPI provides a comprehensive assessment of peace in Mexico detailing the level of peace in each of the 32 states over the last 10 years and an analysis of the costs associated with violence as well as the socio-economic dimensions associated with peace.

mpi-coverThe study finds that there was a 7.4% improvement in Mexico’s peace scores in the last two years, driven by decreases in organized crime, violent crime, and weapons crime. However, over the past 10 years Mexico experienced a marked increase in direct violence, with peace declining by 27%. A key factor was the 37% increase in the homicide rate since 2007.

The 2013 MPI presents comparisons between the states and the regions of Mexico, and finds that the states with the highest levels of peace are: Campeche, Queretaro, Hidalgo, Yucatan and Baja California Sur while the five least peaceful states are: Morelos, Guerrero, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Quintana Roo.

The study finds that Oaxaca, Chiapas and Yucatan experienced the most substantial increases in their levels of peace during the last decade. Oaxaca improved its score by 22% and Chiapas by 17%.  These states were found to be relatively peaceful in comparison with other areas of Latin America and North America. Campeche, for example, has a level of peace comparable with the states of New Mexico and Delaware in the United States.

Regionally, the research finds that the eastern region of Mexico is the most peaceful, while the northern region is the most violent.

Analysis of federal funding to state police (Fondo de Aportaciones para la Seguridad Publica) finds that increases in police funding are related to crime reporting rates, with increased funding improving the public’s relationship with the police.

The direct cost of violence to the Mexican economy is 3.8% of GDP, while the indirect costs amount to 12% for a total 2.49 trillion pesos (15.8% of GDP). Under optimal conditions, if there was no violence in Mexico, the economy would have the potential to improve by up to 27%. This figure includes direct and indirect costs and the additional flow-on economic activity that would eventuate from new money being added to the economy. The study highlights that if all the states of Mexico were as peaceful as Campeche, the most peaceful state in the country, Mexico would reap an economic benefit of 2.26 trillion pesos.

The most peaceful Mexican states in 2003 experienced the strongest economic performance in 2012. Over the past 10 years, these states’ GDP increased by 9% versus 4% in the least peaceful states.

Steve Killelea, founder and executive chairman of IEP said: “Compared to other countries with a similar level of conflict and development, Mexico has the greatest potential to increase its peace on account of the strength of the structures, attitudes and institutions that sustain peace in the long term.” He added that: “This research aims to provide the evidence base and data for a broader policy debate about how to reduce violence in Mexico”.

Mexico’s standing in regards to positive peace is encouraging: the country has a strong business environment, performs well on measures of human development, and ranks better than world averages on education.

Factors impacting peace in Mexico

It is well known that the increase in the levels of violence in Mexico has been a consequence of the war against drug trafficking, but there are other key factors at play.

The number of firearms smuggled into Mexico increased substantially during the last decade, almost three times higher in the period 2010-2012 than between 1997 and 1999.

As a consequence, the weapons crime indicator, which measures the number of offenses involving the use of weapons, recorded a significant increase of 117% per 100,000 people during the last decade.

The measure of the efficiency of the justice system has recorded a significant deterioration. In some states up to 95% of homicides remain unpunished.

In addition, the public perception of corruption is very high and one of the greatest challenges facing Mexico.

Prison capacity is overstretched with a Mexico Evalua 2013 report stating that 52.4% of prisons in the country are over-crowded and house 74% of the prison population in Mexico.

There is a high level of unreported crime in Mexico. According to data from the National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Safety 2012 (ENVIPE), only 19% of theft, 10% of fraud and 10% of extortion cases are reported.

It is important to address all of these key challenges in order to reduce violence and realise the social and economic benefits of peace in Mexico.

This post is the text of a press release from the Institute for Economics and Peace. For more information about the report, visit http://visionofhumanity.org/#/page/news/812 and http://visionofhumanity.org/#/page/indexes/mexico-peace-index

The full 96-page report – available here – is well worth reading and offers many more insights into the changes taking place in Mexico.

Related posts:

Survey in March 2013 identifies crime as Mexico’s biggest public concern

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Oct 262013
 

The Pew Research Global Attitudes Project (released 24 October 2013) provides results of face to face interviews with a national sample of 1,000 adult Mexicans. The report revealed opinions concerning a wide variety of issues including the country’s direction, most important concerns, law and order, drug war, national institutions and attitudes toward the USA. Mexicans are generally dissatisfied with their country. In March 2013, 69% of Mexicans said they were dissatisfied, up from 63% in 2012, but down from 79% in 2010. The survey suggests that crime is a major cause for dissatisfaction.

The biggest concern identified in the survey is crime which 81% said was a very big problem, up from 73% in 2012. Several other crime-related issues topped the very big problem list: cartel-related violence (71%), illegal drugs (70%), human rights violations by the military and police (70%) and corrupt political leaders (69%). The concern for crime causes real fear. The survey noted that 63% say they are afraid to walk alone at night within one kilometer of their home, up 7% from 2012 and 13% from 2007. Women were only slightly more concerned about their safety than men (65% versus 60%). Those in urban areas were significantly more worried about safety than those in rural areas (70% versus 43%). On the other hand, the fact that over four in ten in rural areas were worried is both surprising and startling.

Unfortunately, we do not have a complete regional breakdown of the survey respondents. We speculate that crime is perceived as a bigger problem in high crime areas such as the north. Attitudes toward bribery appear to support this view. While 32% said they had to pay a bribe to a government official in the past year; the percentages ranged from 51% in the north to 18% in the Mexico City Region.

Over two-thirds (68%) felt that government should focus on maintaining law and order rather than protecting human rights (18%). Only 11% said that both were equally important. It is interesting that respondents from all three major political parties gave almost equal high priority to law and order: Party of the Democratic Revolution (PDR) – 66%; National Action Party (PAN) – 69% and Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) – 70%.

The drug war continues to be a problem; only 37% think the government is making progress, compared to 47% in 2012. Fully 29% said the government is losing ground in the drug war and 30% think it is about the same as it has been in the past. Over half (56%) blame both Mexico and the USA for drug violence. Only 20% blame just the USA, while 17% blame just Mexico. The vast majority (85%) want the Mexican army to fight drug cartels and over half (55%) would like the US government to provide weapons and training to fight the drug war. Only 34% would like to have US troops in Mexico fighting the cartels.

Given that the drug war is not going well and the military is implicated in many human rights violations, it is surprising that 72% of survey respondents feel that the military has a good influence on Mexico. This was higher than any other institution. About 68% felt the national government has a good influence. Other institutions got lower scores: the media – 66%, President Peña Nieto – 57%, Congress – 45%, court system – 44%, and police – 42%.

Aside from crime and related issues, Mexicans identified several other major problems. About five in eight (63%) considered poor quality schools a very big problem, way up from 49% in 2012. This increase was probably related to the arrest of the teachers’ union president and focus on the dire need for education reform. Other very big problems were pollution (60%), terrorism (59%) and people leaving Mexico for jobs (53%). This last item is a bit surprising since in recent years (since the Great Recession) relatively few Mexicans have left in search of jobs.

The percentage viewing the USA favorably has changed considerably in recent years. In early 2010, before passage of Arizona’s restrictive immigration law, 66% viewed the USA favorably. After passage of the law, this dropped to 44%, compared to an unfavorable view of 48%, up from 27% before the law. Clearly passage of that law had a very big impact on Mexicans. However the favorable ratings increased to 52% in 2011, 56% in 2012 and 66% in 2013. Meanwhile the unfavorable ratings dropped to 41% in 2011, 34% in 2012 and 30% in 2013.

Only 17% said they had traveled to the USA, but 21% indicated their families received money from relatives north of the border. About 47% indicated that moving to the USA leads to a better life, while 18% say it leads to a worse life. However, 44% say having citizens living in the USA is bad for Mexico, an equal number say it is good for Mexico. Apparently, the view is that it is good for individuals to move to the USA, but such moves may not necessarily be good for Mexico as a whole. Consistent with this, 35% said they would move to the USA if they had the means and opportunity, 20% would migrate without authorization while 15% would only migrate if they had authorization.

It will be interesting to see how these opinions change when the 2014 survey is conducted.

Related posts:

The pattern of homicides in Mexico in 2012

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Aug 172013
 

Homicide rates in Mexico increased between 2010 and 2012, though there is some evidence that they are now beginning to fall again. Did the pattern of homicide rates also change since 2010?

The top map shows the pattern of intentional homicides in Mexico in 2010. As we commented at the time, this map shows “that many northern states like Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Nuevo León and Durango are plagued by drug war violence and have very high murder rates. On the other hand, most states in the south and southeast, like Yucatán, Campeche and Tlaxcala are relatively free of drug war violence and historically have had low murder rates. One significant anomaly in the overall pattern appears to be Guerrero which is well to the south but has a high murder rate and a very significant amount of drug violence.”

Map of intentional homicide rate, 2010

Map of intentional homicide (murder) rate, 2010 Credit: Tony Burton / Geo-Mexico

The second map shows the pattern of intentional homicides in Mexico in 2012. (Note that the values on the key are slightly different to reflect the increase in Mexico’s average (nationwide) homicide rate between 2010 and 2012).

Map of homicide rates in Mexico, 2012, Credit: Tony Burton/ Geo-Mexico

Map of intentional homicide (murder) rates in Mexico. Credit: Tony Burton/ Geo-Mexico

At first sight the pattern in 2012 look pretty similar to that for 2010. The adjoining states of Sinaloa, Chihuahua and Durango continue to have rates well above the national average, as does Guerrero further south. However, the homicide rate in Nuevo León, which was “well above average” in 2010 has declined somewhat to “above average” in 2012. Since 2010, the north-eastern state of Tamaulipas has seen its homicide rate increase from “above average” to “well above average”. Perhaps more significantly, the border state of Coahuila has witnessed a jump from “below average” to “well above average”. Homicide rates in the two north-west border states of Baja California and Sonora have fallen since 2010 to “below average”.

Elsewhere, homicide rates have increased in both Zacatecas and in Colima since 2010, while rates in Veracruz have declined to “below average”. The shift in Veracruz means that a broad swathe of southern Mexico, including the Yucatán Peninsula, Oaxaca and Chiapas, now has a homicide rate “below average” or “well below average”, good news for tourists headed for Oaxaca, Cancún and the Riviera Maya!

On a more cautionary note, the state of Michoacán has seen increased violence in 2013; its homicide rate is headed upwards.

The changes in pattern of homicides between 2010 and 2012 are partially attributable to the “zones of contention” between rival drug gangs. For instance, the Knights Templar cartel (currently thought to be Mexico’s third largest cartel, behind the Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel) has its origin in  Michoacán but has expanded its geographic influence very rapidly in the past few years. Equally, the capture of key cartel leaders in recent years seems to herald increased violence as rivals compete to fill the perceived power vacuum left behind. This unfortunate outcome from the arrest of leading cartel operatives is continuing this year following the capture of Zeta leader Z-40.

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Has the homicide rate in Mexico begun to fall?

 Mexico's geography in the Press, Updates to Geo-Mexico  Comments Off on Has the homicide rate in Mexico begun to fall?
Aug 102013
 

The National Statistics Institute (INEGI) recently published state-by-state intentional homicide (murder) statistics for 2012. The values calculated by INEGI for rates/100,000 population rely on CONAPO’s estimates for the population each year. The INEGI report includes homicide trends from 1990 to 2012.

From 1992 to about 2007, homicide rates in Mexico declined (see graphic) to 8/100,000 in 2007. However, during former President Felipe Calderón’s “War on Drugs”, the homicide rate almost tripled. In 2010 and 2011, the national rate averaged 23/100,0000. These national averages mask a huge difference between males and females. For example, the 2011 rate for males was 43/100,000, about eight times higher than the 5/100,000 recorded for females. As the graphic shows, there is some slight evidence that the homicide rate for males is beginning to fall again.

Trends in homicide rate, 1990-2012 (Data: INEGI)

Trends in homicide rate, 1990-2012 (Data: INEGI)

Mexico’s intentional homicide rate is about the same as that in Brazil (21/100,000). Both countries have rates that are very high compared to Peru (10), the USA (5), Canada (1.6) or the UK (1.2). On the other hand, the intentional homicide rates in Mexico and Brazil are quite low compared to Honduras (92), El Salvador (69) Venezuela (45) and South Africa (32). [Figures for other countries from wikipedia]

In a later post we will look at the pattern of homicides in 2012, and compare a map of homicide rates in 2012 to our previous analysis of the homicide pattern in 2010:

How does corruption in Mexico compare to Brazil, China, India and Russia?

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Mar 282013
 

Corruption is a serious concern in Mexico and these other four major emerging economies. Corruption is rather subjective and not an easy concept to measure. This post looks into corruption in Mexico, Brazil, China, India and Russia, as reported by Transparency International (TI) in its Perceived Corruption Index 2012 and the World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Report for 2012-2013.

Transparency International’s “Index of Perceived Corruption” is based on a wide array of surveys, polls of international experts and interviews with knowledgeable residents. In TI’s analysis of 2007 results, Mexico, Brazil, China and India were all tied at 72nd out of 179 countries. Russia was far behind at 143rd However, by 2012, Mexico had slipped to 105th; India had dropped to 94th, China to 80th, while Brazil improved a bit to 69th. (See also Tim Padgett’s “Tale of Two Corruptos: Brazil and Mexico on Different Transparency Paths”.) Russia moved up a bit, but still was 133rd. Mexico’s fall in the rankings might have been associated with the explosion of drug cartel violence between 2007 and 2012.

The World Justice Project (WJP)’s 2012-2013 Report “Absence of Corruption” ranked Brazil and China at 38th of 97 countries; Russia was ranked 70th, Mexico 74th and India 81st. These WJP rankings do not correlate very well with those of Transparency International (IT). For example, Russia appears far more corrupt in the TI rankings, while India looks more corrupt on the WJP rankings.

The WJP looks into four separate corruption sub-factors. These are listed below with the ranks of the five countries:

1. Government officials in the executive branch do not use public office for private gain.

  • Brazil (40th of 97), Mexico (49th), China (49th), Russia (56th) India (89th)

2. Government officials in the judicial branch do not use public office for private gain.

  • Brazil (33rd), India (52nd), Russia (67th), China (70th), Mexico (84th)

3. Government officials in the police and the military do not use public office for private gain.

  • China (36th), Brazil (37th), Russia (67th), Mexico (84th), India (86th)

4. Government officials in the legislative branch do not use public office for private gain.

  • China (30th), Mexico (51th), Brazil (75th), Russia (77th), India (81st)

The results suggest that Mexico’s main corruption problems are not with the executive and legislative branches, perhaps because the Mexican constitution limits elected officials to only one term. The main problems are with the judicial and police/military branches. Mexico’s judicial reform program which is currently being implemented, should reduce judicial and police corruption. Also police and penal code reforms advocated by President Peña Nieto’s “Pact for Mexico” should help. Mexico’s future corruption ranks according to both TI and WJP could be a bit better because the “Pact for Mexico” identifies corruption as a priority. Only time will tell.

Does Mexico have an “Open Government”?

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Mar 122013
 

The World Justice Project (WJP) 2012-2013 Report recently assessed 97 countries on eight Rule of Law factors. The “Open Government” factor involves engagement, access, participation, and collaboration between the government and its citizens. It includes accountability, freedom of information, and ability to petition the government.

The WJP ranked Mexico 32nd of 97 countries in terms of “Open Government”. Brazil ranked one better at 31st, while India (48th), China (69th) and Russia (70th) trailed significantly. For comparison, Sweden was ranked 1st, Canada 6th, USA 13th, Ghana 30th, Italy 47th, Guatemala 58th. Four African countries occupied the very bottom places: Ethiopia, Cameroon, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe (94th to 97th , respectively).

In assessing open governments, the WJP uses four subfactors (with Mexico’s rank among the 97 countries in parentheses):

  1. The laws are publicized and accessible (48th)
  2. The laws are stable (26th)
  3. Right to petition the government and public participation (53rd)
  4. Official information is available on request (39th)

These scores suggest that Mexico is pretty much in the middle of the 97 countries assessed. It would do well to focus attention on better publicizing laws and encouraging public participation.

A previous post focused on the WJP analysis of Mexico’s “Criminal Justice System”. Future posts will investigate other “Rule of Law” dimensions of the WJP study.

Reforms badly needed for Mexico’s criminal justice system

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Mar 052013
 

The World Justice Project (WJP) 2012-2013 Report recently assessed 97 countries in terms of Rule of Law, which the WJP defines as “the underlying framework and rights that make prosperous and fair societies possible… where laws protect fundamental rights, and where justice is accessible for all”. Its definition includes four universal principles:

  1. The government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law.
  2. The laws are clear, publicized, stable and fair, and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property.
  3. The process by which the laws are enacted, administered and enforced is accessible, fair and efficient.
  4. Justice is delivered by competent, ethical and independent representatives and neutrals, who are sufficient in number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.

The WJP looks at eight “rule of law” factors: limited government powers, absence of corruption, order and security, fundamental rights, open government, regulatory enforcement, civil justice and criminal justice. Rather than attempt to combine all these factors into one rule of law index, the WJP looks at each factor separately. National scores on each factor are developed by surveying 1000 respondents in each country, as well as collecting questionnaires from in-country experts. This post looks at criminal justice; future posts will look at other rule of law factors.

Mexico scored particularly poorly with respect to “Criminal Justice” which the WJP defines as “a key aspect of the rule of law, as it constitutes the natural mechanism to redress grievances and bring action against individuals for offenses against society. An effective criminal justice system is capable of investigating and adjudicating criminal offences effectively, impartially, and without improper influence, while ensuring that the rights of suspects and victims are protected.”

According to the WJP report, Mexico’s criminal justice system ranks a very low 89st of 97 countries. It was 13th of 16 Latin American countries, and 29th of 30 middle income countries. These very low ranks are startling, given Mexico’s relatively high marks on most development indicators. Mexico even ranked below such economically poor countries as Pakistan (80th), Guatemala (84th), Egypt (56th), Ethiopia (49th), Senegal (54th) and Tanzania (47th) as well as behind Brazil (52nd), Russia (75th), India (64th) and China (39th). By way of comparison, Denmark ranked 1st, Canada 13th , Botswana 18th, and the USA 27th.

In assessing criminal justice, the WJP uses seven subfactors (with Mexico’s rank among the 97 countries):

  • criminal investigation system is effective (77th of 97),
  • criminal adjudication system is timely and effective (84th),
  • correctional system is effective in reducing criminal behavior (85th),
  • criminal justice system is impartial (89th),
  • criminal justice system is free of corruption (87th),
  • criminal justice system is free of improper government influence (57th),
  • due process of law and rights of the accused (78th).

Mexico ranked behind Brazil, China, India and Russia on all seven of these subfactors with only a couple of exceptions. China ranked 97th (dead last) and Russia ranked 80th in “criminal justice system is free of improper government influence.” Also Russia ranked behind Mexico at 84th in “due process of law and rights of the accused.”

These really poor ranks indicate that virtually all aspects of the Mexican criminal justice system are in dire need of reform and improvement. Fortunately, reform is on the way. “Judicial Reform in Mexico,” (published by the Trans-Border Institute of the University of San Diego in May 2010) summarizes the four main elements of Mexico’s Judicial Reform Law, approved by Congress in 2008, as:

  1. new oral, open to the public, adversarial procedures
  2. presumption of innocence and adequate legal defense for all accused
  3. modification of police and investigatory procedures
  4. tougher measures for combating organized crime

The reforms are scheduled for implementation by 2016, but may take a bit longer.

Some states, like Chihuahua, State of México, Morelos, Oaxaca, Nuevo León and Zacatecas, have already started implementing reforms, but some other states are lagging well behind. Full implementation of all the much needed judicial reforms will take many years, perhaps decades. On the bright side, at least reforms are in the process of being implemented.

The geography of Mexico’s drug trade: new cartels involved in turf wars

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Feb 202013
 

As we suggested a year ago – Mexico’s drug cartels and their shifting areas of operation, a 2012 update  – it is increasingly difficult to track the areas of operation of the major drug trafficking groups in Mexico. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control recently added a new narcotrafficking group in Mexico, the Meza Flores family, to its list of Foreign Narcotics Kingpins. (This designation prohibits people in the USA from engaging in transactions with the named individuals or their organization, and freezes any assets the individuals or organization may have under U.S. jurisdiction).

According to the Treasury Department’s statement, the Meza Flores family began operations in about 2000 and is responsible for the distribution of considerable quantities of methamphetamines, heroin, cocaine and marijuana in the USA. It is headed by Fausto Isidro Meza Flores (aka “Chapito Isidro”) and is based in the town of Guasave, in the state of Sinaloa. (Meza Flores was previously in the Juárez cartel before becoming a high ranking member of the now defunct Beltran Leyva cartel).

The Meza Flores group is a direct rival of the long-established and very powerful Sinaloa cartel. The Sinaloa cartel is headed by Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera, who has been on the run since escaping from the maximum security jail in Almoloya de Juárez, near Toluca, in 2001. According to Forbes Magazine, Guzman Loera is currently Mexico’s 10th richest individual, with assets of around one billion dollars.

Mexico’s “War on Drugs” in recent years has led to a fragmentation of the major cartels. Some experts claim that as many as 80 distinct groups are now involved in drug production and trafficking. Many of these groups are small and highly localized, but this fragmentation has increased the incidence of turf wars between rival groups. These turf wars have caused extreme levels of violence in some parts of the country. Once one side is firmly in control, the violence drops.

The current federal administration has said that some 70,000 people died in Mexico between 2006 and 2012 as a result of the activities of organized crime. Recent press reports such as Jalisco: La invasión de Los Templarios claim that one on-going boundary war is along the state boundary between Michoacán and Jalisco. This conflict is between the Michoacán-based Knights Templar (Los Caballeros Templarios, LCT) and the Jalisco-based New Generation cartel (CJNG).

The LCT is comprised largely of former members of  La Familia Michoacana (LFM), a group which is now almost defunct. Other members of LFM joined the Zetas, the Sinaloa cartel’s arch enemy. The CJNG started out as enforcers for the Sinaloa Cartel.

Violence linked to this particular turf war has occurred in numerous municipalities including Jilotlán de los Dolores, Pihuamo, Mazamitla, San José de Gracia, La Barca, Atotonilco, Ayotlán, Tizapán el Alto, Tuxcueca, Jocotepec and Chapala (all in Jalisco), as well as Briseñas, Yurécuaro, Sahuayo, Marcos Castellanos, La Piedad, Zamora, Cotija de La Paz, Tepalcatepec, Los Reyes, Peribán and Apatzingán (all in Michaocán).

This is not the only turf war currently underway in Mexico. For example, further north, another recent hot spot has erupted along the Durango-Coahuila border, especially in the La Laguna area centered on the city of Torreón.

Related posts:

Mexican attitudes on the drug war, violence and crime

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Jul 162012
 

Mexican drug cartels and related violence have received enormous attention. For an overview, see Mexico’s drug cartels and their shifting areas of operation, a 2012 update. All Mexicans are aware of the issue and millions have been affected directly. What are their current views and attitudes? A face-to-face survey in April 2012 by the Pew Research Center of 1,200 Mexicans in Mexico sheds light on this issue.

Most Mexicans (80%) support President Calderon’s decision to use the military to fight drug traffickers. On the other hand, less than half (47%) think the campaign against drug traffickers is “making progress”. Fully 30% feel the government is losing ground. While they support use of the military, 74% indicate that human rights violations by the military and the police are a “very big problem”.

Mexicans are not sure which political party is better for dealing with Mexico’s drug problems. Just over a quarter (28%) think President Calderon’s National Action Party (PAN) (28%) would do a better job compared to 25% for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and only 13% for the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Fully 23% said that none of the three major parties is capable of resolving the issue. A possible reason for this is that only 14% blame mostly Mexico for the problem, compared to 22% who mostly blame the USA and 61% who blame both countries.

In general, Mexicans want the USA to help solve the drug problem. Fully 75% favor the USA training Mexican police and military personnel and 61% also approve of the USA providing money and weapons to the country’s police and military. On the other hand only a third favor deploying USA troops within Mexico, while 59% oppose this.

Mexicans feel that their country is facing some serious problems. Three-quarters of Mexicans think cartel-related violence (75%) and human rights violations by police and military (74%) are “very big problems”. The related issues of crime (73%), corruption (69%) and illegal drugs (68%) were also identified as “very big problems” by most survey respondents. Apparently, Mexicans do not feel very safe. More than half (56%) said they were afraid to walk alone at night within a kilometer of their home, 61% for women and 51% for men. Unfortunately, Mexicans are not very optimistic that the country’s drug violence problems will go away any time soon. On the bright side, 51% of the surveyed Mexicans felt their economy would improve in the next year compared to only 16% who thought it would worsen.

Related posts:

How much drugs money is laundered in Mexico each year?

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Apr 212012
 

Despite this being an obvious question, there is no simple or generally accepted answer! However, a document published last month by Centro de Estudios Sociales y de Opinión Pública de la Cámara de Diputados (CESOP), entitled Lavado de dinero: indicadores y acciones de gobierno binacionales (“Money Laundering: bi-national indicators and government actions”) does offer some clues and estimates.

For example, according to Mexico’s tax authorities (SHCP), the nation’s financial system “gained” at least 10 billion dollars last year from unrecorded, presumably illicit, activities such as drug trafficking. North of the border, the US State Department believes that money laundering in Mexico accounts for between 8 billion and 25 billion dollars a year, while figures as high as 29 billion dollars have been offered in the US Congress.

Financial models developed by Global Financial Integrity and Columbia University in the City of New York suggest that the total “gains” from all forms of illegal activities in the USA are about 196 billion dollars (1.36% of US GDP), and that about 90% of this amount is laundered each year. The same models, applied to Mexico, suggest total crime-related profits of 38 billion dollars (3.6% of Mexico’s GDP), only 10-14 billion dollars of which is laundered into the formal economy.

If the models are to be believed, in the USA, 46% of the total amount laundered derives from drug trafficking, 32% from people trafficking, 15% from pirated goods and 7% from fraud. In Mexico, 41% of laundered money originates from drugs, 33% from people trafficking, 20% from pirated goods and 6% from fraud.

Despite the considerable variation in numbers, most of the figures and calculations fall within, or close to, the range of values (between 2 and 5% of global GDP) that is estimated by the International Monetary Fund to be laundered each year around the world.

How does money laundering work, and what is being done about it?

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Mar 152012
 

How is drugs money laundered?

Drug funds have allegedly financed hotels, car dealerships, bus companies, airlines, casinos, beauty salons, skyscrapers and restaurants, as well as the lavish lifestyles of individual cartel members who acquire gold jewelry, expensive cars, vehicles, yachts and planes.

“Trade-based laundering” is on the rise. Drug cartels are reported to be increasingly using regular cross-border trade to launder their ill-gotten gains. Profits from the sale of drugs in the USA and elsewhere are used to purchase truckloads of goods such as fruit, toys and fabric, which are then sent south to Mexico to be sold for pesos. This cross-border trade effectively changes US dollars into pesos with few questions being asked.

In a variation on the theme, the dollars are used to buy things such as toys or fabric from a third country such as China. The goods are then exported to Mexico and resold. The net effect is the same: dollars become pesos, ready to help pay for the next shipments of drugs. Trade-based laundering is hidden in the massive regular trade-flows between Mexico and the USA which total almost 400 billion dollars a year. Authorities always seem to be one step behind the cartels, partly because, as this LA Times article points out, cartel bosses are “among the world’s most expert transnational entrepreneurs”. Indeed, the sheer scale of the drug money flows threatens to overwhelm Mexico’s police and security forces.

Drug money is being transferred via a variety of means, from cash transfers (formal or informal) and deposits in bank accounts to the purchase of goods and services (including pirated merchandise).

How can money laundering be reduced?

In recent years, Mexican authorities have focused more attention on chasing the money involved in the drugs trade. Government officials claim that more than $50 billion in drugs money is laundered each year, more than the value of Mexico’s oil exports and equivalent to 3% of GDP. Mexico’s laws are barely keeping up with the ingenuity of money launderers, and convictions for money-laundering are rare.

What has Mexico done to try and prevent money laundering? There are now strict limits on the use of US dollars in Mexico, and on cash deposits into bank accounts. The latest tightening of the rules extends the reporting of higher value US dollar transactions to all real estate offices, car dealerships, betting parlors, art galleries and public notaries. Any purchases using cash for items such as vehicles costing over about $14,000, and for real estate over about $70,000 are now automatically reported to federal authorities.

As Mexico tightens its accountancy rules, drug gangs may have to keep more of their funds in the USA or go elsewhere. Mexico is becoming a much less friendly place for the drug cartels’ informal “retirement funds”.

Mexico City has largely escaped drug violence

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Mar 082012
 

Previous posts have analyzed drug war death rates in Mexican states, cities over 500,000, the most violent municipalities and areas of particular interest to expatriates. This post focuses on Mexico City or D.F. (Distrito Federal). We focus on D.F. because the rate of drug war deaths is exceptionally low there, less than one eighth the national average.

In all of 2010 there were 191 drug war deaths in D.F. [note 1] compared to 122 in the first nine months of 2011. [note 2] While this might sound like a large number of deaths, we must remember that there are almost nine million people in D.F.  The 2011 drug war death rate per 100,000/yr in D.F. was 1.8 compared to a national rate 15.3 and a rate of 134 in Acapulco. [note 3] The rate for D.F. declined 15% from the 2010 rate while the rates for all of Mexico and Acapulco increased by 13% and 187% respectively. Today, people seeking better security are moving into D.F. from other cities in the country.

Why are the rates in D.F. so low? In previous decades D.F. was thought to be one of the most violent places in the country, but this is no longer the case. The total murder rate for D.F. is half the national rate [note 4] and less than a third that of Washington, DC. [note 5] A major reason is that D.F. has a more competent, better organized, better paid and less corrupt police force than any of the other cities. The fact that the national government is in D.F. also helps as do more effective youth programs. That D.F. has higher overall income levels is also a factor. Some even speculate that major cartel bosses have family in D.F. and have an unspoken agreement to avoid violence in the capital [note 6].

The drug war death rates are quite low in all parts of the city. The wealthy delegation of Cuajimalpa in western D.F. had zero deaths in 2011 compared to 11 a year earlier. In 2010 it had the city’s highest rate of 5.9, but this was still less than half the national average. Relatively sparsely populated Milpa Alta in the southeast also had zero deaths in 2011. Cuauhtemoc and Venustiano Carranza, two central delegations, had the highest rates in 2011, but they both less than a third the national average.

The 13 suburban municipalities adjacent to D.F. in the State of Mexico experienced 331 drug war deaths in 2011, almost three times the number in D.F. These suburbs with a total population of just over six million had a combined drug war death rate of 7.3, four times as high as D.F. While the death rate in these municipalities increased 42% over the 2010 level, it was still less than half the national average. Based on the data presented above, it is not surprising that people worried about drug violence would rather live in or near D.F. than in most other cities, especially those in northern and western Mexico.

Notes:
  1. “Mexican drugs war murders data mapped”, The Guardian, posted by Johanna Tuckman, Jan 14, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jan/14/mexico-drug-war-murders-map. For data see: http://www.google.com/fusiontables/DataSource?dsrcid=393962.
  2. “Van mas de 47 mil muertos por nacroviolencia: PGR”, El Universal, 12 January 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/822078.html.
  3. The rates for 2011 were adjusted because data are available for only the first nine months of the year.
  4. “Is Mexico City safe from drug cartel war – or the next target,” CNN, January 17, 2012, .http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/17/world/americas/mexico-city-security/index.html
  5. “Mexico’s violence not as widespread as seems,” USAToday, 3 August 2010. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-08-03-Mexico-drug-violence_N.htm.
  6. Is Mexico City safe from drug cartel war — or the next target,” CNN, January 17, 2012, .http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/17/world/americas/mexico-city-security/index.html.

Drug war death trends in areas of Mexico of interest to foreign tourists and retirees

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Mar 022012
 

Non-Mexicans are far more interested in some parts of Mexico than others. These areas of interest may be well-known tourist destinations, have thousands of expatriate residents or are located on major expatriate travel routes. Mexico’s major cities, which are also of interest to foreigners, were discussed in a previous post. This post focuses on 24 municipalities of less than 500,000 population. (These are listed alphabetically in the table linked to at the end of the post.)

Drug war death rates vary enormously among the 24 communities. Data released by the Office of the President [note 1] indicate that some of these municipalities have extremely high drug war death rates. The number of deaths in Zihuatanejo went from 16 in 2010 [note 2] to a startling 90 in the first nine months of 2011. This results in a rate of 115 deaths per 100,000 population/yr or over seven times the national average of 15.3 [note 3]. This places Zihuatanejo among the 20 most dangerous communities in Mexico (see earlier post) along with the other famous Guerrero beach resort of Acapulco.

Other dangerous municipalities listed in the table are Tepic, Nayarit at 69 (4.5 times the average); Mazatlán at 58 (3.8 times the average) and Nuevo Laredo at 50 (3.3 times the average). Thousands of expatriates live in Mazatlán while thousands drive through Tepic and Nuevo Laredo. The temporal trends in these dangerous cities vary widely. Between 2010 and 2011, the rate for Zihuatanejo went up 650% while Nuevo Laredo’s increased by 67% and Tepic edged up 14%. The rate for Mazatlán was down 20%.

The most worrisome trend is the very rapid drug violence increase in Veracruz State. From 2010 to 2011 the death rate for Xalapa went up 1,066%. In 2010 there were a total of 15 drug war deaths in Xalapa, Boca del Río and Veracruz City combined; but in the first nine months of 2011 this went up to 284. It remains to be seen if this dreadful trend will continue into 2012 and beyond.

Other cities in the table with rates significantly above the national average include Nogales with a rate of 28, down 68% from 2009. The rate for Playas de Rosarito (Baja California) was up 41% to 28, nearly double the average of 15.3. Matamoros’ rate increased 13% to 20 while Cuernavaca’s was down 49% to 19.

The death rates in towns near Lake Chapala varied markedly. The rate for Ixtlahuacán de los Membrillos dropped from 34 in 2010 to 16 in 2010, but was still above the national average and twice the rate of neighboring Chapala. The rate for nearby Jocotepec of 13 was between the other two. Though local media suggest a growing drug violence problem in these three communities, the actual number of deaths dropped from 24 in 2010 to 12 in 2011. The death rate for the three communities dropped from 34% above average in 2010 to 33% below average in 2011.

The great news is that three of communities in the table—Bahia de Banderas, Guanajuato and San Miguel de Allende—had zero drug war deaths in the first nine months of 2011, compared to 27 in 2010. Bahia de Banderas, in Nayarit just north of Puerto Vallarta, is of particular interest because it had 19 deaths in 2010. If this precipitous drop is not a statistical anomaly it represents a major anomaly because the number of deaths in the adjoining community of Puerto Vallarta almost doubled from 15 in 2010 to 28 in 2011; furthermore there were 196 deaths in nearby Tepic.

Several tourist areas had drug war death rates less than a sixth the national average. These include Ensenada, La Paz and Los Cabos on the Baja Peninsula as well as Oaxaca City. Not far behind was Playa del Carmen with a rate about one quarter of the average. These data suggest that tourists worried about drug violence and seeking a beach resort vacation might lean toward Baja California Sur or the Maya Riviera instead of Acapulco, Zihuatanejo or Mazatlán.

Notes:

[1] “Van mas de 47 mil muertos por nacroviolencia: PGR”, El Universal, 12 January 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/822078.html.

[2] “Mexican drugs war murders data mapped”, Theguradian, posted by Johanna Tuckman, Jan 14, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jan/14/mexico-drug-war-murders-map. For data see: http://www.google.com/fusiontables/DataSource?dsrcid=393962.

[3] The rates for 2011 were adjusted because data are available for only the first nine months of the year.

Which Mexican communities have the highest drug war death rates?

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Feb 232012
 

In a previous post we noted that big Mexican cities with populations of over 500,000 have drug war death rates about 40% higher than the rest of Mexico. However the highest rates of all are in small northern municipalities which have experienced very high levels of drug violence.

Mier, Tamaulipas was the most dangerous municipality in 2011 as it was in 2010. Though the number of drug war deaths in the town of 4,768 (2010) decreased from 93 in 2010 [note 1] to 50 in the first nine months of 2011 [note 2], it still led the country with 1,398 drug war deaths per 100,000/yr [note 3]. This is 91 times the rate for all of Mexico which was 15.3 in 2011 and also over ten times as dangerous as Acapulco, the large city with the highest rate of drug violence. Actually the death rate per population for Mier is probably higher because the mayor estimates that a third of the population may have fled the violence-prone town [note 4]. Mier is only about eight kilometers (five miles) from the Texas border and roughly midway between Nuevo Laredo and Reynosa. The municipality may be a bit more peaceful now that the Mexican military has occupied the town.

Guerrero, Mier’s immediate neighbor to the northwest with a population of 4,468, ranked second with a death rate of 1,045 or roughly 68 times the average. Both Guerrero and Mier are located between two warring drug cartels, the Zetas and the Gulf Cartel. Mier’s other neighbor along the Rio Grande, Miguel Alemán, fared somewhat better. Its death rate dropped from 407 in 2010 to 114 in 2011; but its 2011 rate was still over seven times the national average. The data reveal that municipalities along the border between Nuevo Laredo and Reynosa are among the most dangerous in all of Mexico. Interestingly, the rate for Reynosa itself was only 11 or about 27% below the average.

In third place is San Fernando, also in Tamaulipas, with a death rate of 680, about 44 times the average. This community of 57,220 suffered 292 deaths in 2011. Over half of these deaths were discovered in mass graves of Central Americans who were trying to immigrate to the US, but were kidnapped and murdered by drug cartels.

Next on the list are three small municipalities in Chihuahua – Guadalupe (rate of 496), Gran Morelos (373) and Cusihuiriachi (369). The 2011 death rates in these towns were 24 to 32 times the national average. While the rate for Guadalupe declined 42% since 2010, the rates for Gran Morelos and Cusihuiriachi were up 50% and 150% respectively. As mentioned in an earlier post, the State of Chihuahua had the highest 2011 drug war death rate among Mexico’s 32 states.

Drug war death totals in small communities can change dramatically from year to year. For example, Saric, Sonora with a population of 2,703 had 30 deaths in 2010 and zero in 2011. General Bravo, Nuevo Leon had 18 deaths in 2010 and zero in 2011 while Yecora, Sonora had 18 deaths in 2010 and only one in 2011. The number in General Treviño, Nuevo León went from 21 down to only two, but it still had the 8th highest rate among Mexico’s municipalities.

On the other hand, drug war deaths in Boca del Rio, Veracruz went from 2 in 2010 to an alarming 94 in 2011. This resulted in a rate increase of 6,167% and a rate six times the average. The rate for Zihuatanejo de Azueta, Guerrero increased by 650%; that of Yurécuaro, Michoacán went up by 452% while that for Cosalá, Sinaloa was up 317%, giving it a rate 13 times the average.

Zihuatanejo de Azueta is different than many of the other communities with very high drug war death rates because it has a rather large population of 104,609 and includes the famous international resort of Ixtapa. The number of drug war deaths in the municipality went from 16 in 2010 to a very disturbing 90 in 2011, giving it a death rate of 115, almost as high as Acapulco’s rate of 134. Certainly, the high drug war death rates in Zihuatanejo and Acapulco have damaged their tourism industries.

Twenty municipalities had drug war death rate in 2011 higher than 100 per 100,000/yr or about seven times the national average (see table). Two of these are the large municipalities of Ciudad Juárez and Acapulco. The 20 communities are spread across six northern and western states: six in Chihuahua, five in Tamaulipas, three in Guerrero, two in Sinaloa and Michoacán, and one each in Sonora and Nuevo León. Before randomly traveling in areas of these states, it would be a good idea to check local media and bulletin boards for indications of recent drug violence.

Notes:

[1] “Mexican drugs war murders data mapped”, The Guardian, posted by Johanna Tuckman, Jan 14, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jan/14/mexico-drug-war-murders-map. For data see: http://www.google.com/fusiontables/DataSource?dsrcid=393962.

[2] “Van mas de 47 mil muertos por nacroviolencia: PGR”, El Universal, 12 January 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/822078.html.

[3] The rates for 2011 were adjusted because data are available for only the first nine months of the year.

[4] Christopher Sherman (AP), “Drug War: Despite army takeover, fear grips Mexican town”, Press-Telegram, Long Beach, CA, Dec 7, 2011. http://www.presstelegram.com/breakingnews/ci_19488405

Drug war deaths in Mexico’s biggest cities

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Feb 182012
 

Drug war deaths occur in communities of all sizes, but they are a bit more likely in the biggest cities. However, there are gigantic geographic variations. For example, Acapulco, with a population of about 790,000, had 795 drug war deaths in 2011 (Jan–Sept) [note 1] while there were zero drug war deaths in Mérida, with 828,000 residents. Clearly drug cartel battles are very geographically concentrated.

Compared to the rest of the country, Mexico’s 37 largest municipalities with populations of over 500,000 experience about 40% more drug war deaths per 100,000 population than the rest of the country. These big cities account for about 36.5% of Mexico’s population and 44% of the drug war deaths in both 2010 and 2011.

In 2010, Ciudad Juárez was the drug war hotspot with 2,736 deaths for a rate of 206 per 100,000/yr compared to the national rate of 13.6 [note 2]. This dropped by a surprising 41% in 2011 to a rate of 121 [note 3]; but  Ciudad Juárez still led the nation’s death toll with 1,206 deaths. Acapulco’s 795 deaths gave it the highest rate among big cities of 134, up a frightening 186% over 2010. Other dangerous big cities with high drug war death rates include Torreón with a rate 99 (up 100%), Durango with 89 (up 244%), Chihuahua with 65 (down 20%) and Culiacán with 57 (down 17%).

Tijuana used to be a major center of drug violence, but not anymore. Between December 2006 and December 2009, it experienced 1,195 drug war deaths, behind only Ciudad Juárez with 3,699 and Culiacán with 1,303. Its death rate for that period was over four times the national average. But the number of deaths dropped from 472 in 2010 to 183 in 2011 bringing the rate down to 15.6, just above the national average of 15.3. In nearby Mexicali, the rate was only 4.1 in 2011, about a quarter of the average. The state of Baja California is no longer a key battleground in the Mexican drug war.

Drug violence deteriorated most rapidly in Veracruz City which went from 9 deaths in 2010 to 155 in 2011 resulting in a rate increase of almost 2,200%. This increased the rate to 37, nearly two and a half times the national average. Smaller cities in Veracruz State also experienced rapid increases. For example, Jalapa went up 1,066% and Bocas del Rio was up 6,167%. For the state as a whole, the rate was up over 300%. Clearly, the drug war has reached Veracruz.

Drug war violence has also increased rapidly in Monterrey where the number of deaths increased from 179 in 2010 to 399 in 2011, more than doubling its death rate. Deaths in Monterrey’s two large suburbs of Guadalupe and Apodaca also went from 91 to 220. While the rate in Monterrey was just above the national average in 2010, in 2011 it was up to 47, three times the average. Deaths in nearby Saltillo also went up rapidly, from 15 to 50, pushing its rate up by 344%.

Guadalajara also experienced an upsurge in drug violence. While its death rate went up 61% to 7.3 in 2011, this is still less than half the national average. However, the 2011 data do not include the 26 bodies dumped in the city in November 2011. Death rates were also up nearly 50% in Guadalajara’s two big suburbs of Zapopan and Tlaquepaque.

Surprisingly the Mexico City Federal District has been relatively free of drug violence. Total drug war deaths dropped from 191 to 122 pushing its 2011 rate down to only 1.8 deaths per 100,000/yr. This is only about one eighth the national rate. A future post will provide a more detailed analysis of drug violence in Mexico City.

In addition to Mérida, Tuxtla Gutierrez in Chiapas also had zero deaths in 2011. Other big cities with very low drug war death rates include Puebla (0.6), Querétaro (0.8), León (1.9), Toluca (2.1) and Villahermosa (2.5). Apparently drug cartels and their enemies have not been very active in these cities.

Notes:

[1] All the references for 2011 are for January through September based on the data released by Mexican Government

[2] “Mexican drugs war murders data mapped”, The Guardian, posted by Johanna Tuckman, Jan 14, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jan/14/mexico-drug-war-murders-map. For data see: http://www.google.com/fusiontables/DataSource?dsrcid=393962.

[3] The rates for 2011 were adjusted because data are available for only the first nine months of the year.

Mexico’s crime statistics: fishing for the facts

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Feb 152012
 

Diego Valle-Jones’s blog, “Food and Fishing“, is actually more about Mexican crime rates than food and fishing! The blog, described by the author as “mainly about data analysis, programming and statistics, with the occasional interspersed post about food” has numerous posts analyzing the drug war in Mexico. These posts focus partly on geographic patterns of where most activity has occurred but mainly on the quality of the data available and its many deficiencies.

Valle-Jones’ analysis of drug war data is especially enlightening for anyone not familiar with the vagueries of crime-related data in Mexico. Most of his posts are illustrated by well-conceived and well-executed graphics, worthy of close examination in their own right. Posts in the past twelve months on “Food and Fishing” have included:

All are worth reading. It is unfortunate that, unlike Valle-Jones, so many mainstream  journalists have simply repeated facts and figures without any real understanding of where they came from, or what their strengths and weaknesses might be. Food and fishing?  Fishing among the statistics should give them food for thought…

Recent geographic trends in Mexico’s drug violence

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Feb 112012
 

Drug related violent deaths during the first nine months of 2011 increased by about 13% compared to 2010.  Data released by the Office of the President  in January 2012 indicate that from January through September 2011 Mexico had a total of 12,903 drug war deaths. This is a rate of about 15.3 per 100,000 people per year [2011 rates were adjusted because data are available for only the first nine months of the year] compared to 13.6 in 2010 and 7.55 in 2009 [“Mexican drugs war murders data mapped”]. While the rate of increase declined significantly in the past two years, still drug violence is increasing rapidly.

The geographic pattern of drug violence is still mainly concentrated in northern border states and some western states. Chihuahua was still the most violent state with 2,289 deaths in 2011 (Jan-Sept) for a rate of 90 deaths per 100,000 per year.  Other states with high rates were Guerrero (61), Durango (58), Sinaloa (53), Tamaulipas (45), Nayarit (42), Nuevo León (33), and Coahuila (28). Note that four of these states are along the border and four are in western Mexico.

At the other end, Yucatán had only one death for a rate of 0.07. Other states with low rates were Tlaxcala, 0.8; Puebla, 1.22; Querétaro, 1.24; Campeche, 1.62; Chiapas, 1.73; Hidalgo, 1.75; and the Federal District (Mexico City), 1.83. It is very interesting that the drug war death rate in the capital city was one of the lowest in the country and less than one eighth the national. A future post will investigate drug war death rates in Mexico City.

Among border states, drug war death rates decreased significantly for the western states. Baja California was down 38%; Sonora down 36%, and Chihuahua down 31%. Before 2010, Baja California and Sonora had death rates over twice the national average largely because of high death totals in Tijuana and Nogales. However for 2011 the rates for Baja California and Sonora were 31% and 22% below the national average. The worst drug violence in these two northwestern states might be a thing of the past.

The eastern border states all suffered increases. Coahuila was up 99% and Nuevo Leon was up 143%. Both now have death rates over twice the national average. Tamaulipas’ already high rate of 37 in 2010 increased 22% to 45, almost three times the average. Clearly the battleground of drug cartel clashes along the border has shifting to the east.

Violence is up in some western states where it already was quite high. The rate in Guerrero increased 80% to 60 deaths per 100,000 people, four times the national average. Nayarit suffered an increase of 21% to a rate 42, almost three times the average. Smaller, but still significant, increases were registered in Colima, up 24%, and Michoacán, up 40% putting these two states above the average. On the other hand, the some of the violent non-border states experienced declines. The rate in Sinaloa declined 19%; but with a 2011 rate of 53 it is still three and half times the average. Morelos was down 18% putting it just above the average.

Drug violence increased very rapidly in some non-border states that were relatively peaceful through 2010. The drug war death rate in Zacatecas increased 361% while that in Veracruz was up 302%. While these increases are alarming, these two states still had rates below the national average in 2011. Jalisco suffered an increase of 40%, but its 2011 death rate of 11 was still less than three-fourths of the average. The State of México was up 24%, but its rate was still less than a third the average.

In conclusion, drug violence in Mexico continued to increase in 2011. The violence appears to be mostly concentrated in a wide geographic arc formed by the border states and those in western Mexico. Within this region some areas are suffering rapid increases while drug violence is declining in other places.  It is not clear how this pattern will change in the years ahead. To get a clearer picture of the current pattern, in future posts we will investigate trends in drug violence among Mexico’s 2,458 municipalities.

Mexico’s drug cartels and their shifting areas of operation, a 2012 update

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Feb 082012
 

It is becoming harder and harder to keep up with the ever-changing landscape of drug cartel territories. As the government crack-down leads to more and more high-profile arrests, some cartels are struggling to reorganize and lose ground (literally) as rival groups step in to take control. This has resulted in drug-related violence in the past year spreading to new areas, accounting for the serious incidents reported in cities such as Guadalajara and Acapulco and in several parts of the state of Veracruz, even as violence diminishes in some areas where it was previously common. (The patterns of drug-related violence are analyzed in depth in several other posts tagged “drugs” on this site).

Who are the main players?  (February 2012)

According to security analysts Stratfor in their report entitled Polarization and Sustained Violence in Mexico’s Cartel War, polarization is under way among Mexico’s cartels. Smaller groups have been subsumed into either the Sinaloa Federation, which controls much of western Mexico, or Los Zetas, which controls much of eastern Mexico.

The major cartels are:

  1. Los Zetas, now operating in 17 states, control more territory than the Sinaloa Federation, and are more prone to extreme violence. They control much of eastern Mexico.
  2. Sinaloa Federation, formerly the largest cartel, currently in control of most of western Mexico. They have virtually encircled the Juárez Cartel in Cd. Juárez. Their production of methamphetamine has been disrupted by numerous significant seizures of precursor chemicals in west coast ports, including Los Mochis and Mazatlán (Sinaloa), Manzanillo (Colima), Puerto Vallarta (Jalisco) and Lázaro Cárdenas (Michoacán). As a result, the Sinaloa Federation appears to have moved some of its methamphetamine production to Guatemala.
  3. Juárez Cartel, now largely limited to Cd. Juárez
  4. Tijuana Cartel, now dismantled and effectively a subsidiary of the Sinaloa Federation
  5. Cartel del Pacífico Sur; weak, and competing with Zetas in central Mexico states of Guerrero and Michoacán
  6. Gulf Cartel, which still has important presence along Gulf coast, but weakened due to infighting and conflicts with Los Zetas.
  7. Knights Templar (Los Caballeros Templarios) comprises remnants of La Familia Michoacana (LFM), which is now almost defunct. Other former LFM members joined the Zetas.
  8. Independent Cartel of Acapulco is small and apparently weakened.

Alongside these cartels, three “enforcer” groups of organized assassins have arisen: the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (enforcers for the Sinaloa Cartel), La Resistencia (Los Caballeros Templarios) and La Mano con Ojos (Beltrán Leyva).

Cartel areas and drug routes in Mexico

Cartel areas and drug routes in Mexico. Copyright Stratfor. Click map for enlarged version

Turf wars

Drug violence is largely concentrated in areas of conflict between competing cartels. The major trouble spots are Tamaulipas (Gulf Cartel and Zetas); the states of Durango, Coahuila, Zacatecas and San Luis Potosí (Sinaloa Cartel and Zetas); Chihuahua (Juarez Cartel and Sinaloa Cartel); Morelos, Guerrero, Michoacán and State of México (Cartel del Pacífico Sur, aided by Zetas, against Los Caballeros Templarios).

One possible strategy (for the government) would be to stamp out all smaller groups until a single major group controled almost all the trade in drugs. At this point, so the argument goes, incidental violence against third parties would drop dramatically. Such a simplistic approach, however, fails to tackle the economic, political and social roots of narco-trafficking.

Meanwhile, there are some signs that Los Caballeros Templarios, the breakaway faction of LFM, based in the western state of Michoacán, wants to transform itself into a social movement. This is presumably why it has distributed booklets in the region claiming it is fighting a war against poverty, tyranny and injustice.

How do the rates of intentional homicide differ across Mexico?

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Sep 012011
 

In a recent post, we looked at the vexed question of the overall 2010 homicide rate for Mexico. We included a mention of  National System of Public Security (SNSP) data for Mexico that show that there were 18 intentional homicides (murders) per 100,000 population in 2010. This rate varies greatly from state to state (see graph). The rate in the state of Chihuahua, the epicenter of drug war violence, is 112 per 100,000 which is roughly twice as high as any individual country on the planet. Sinaloa which has experienced a rapid upsurge in drug violence was second with a murder rate of 87 per 100,000.

murders by state, 2010

Source: National System of Public Security (SNSP)

Other states with very high murder rates are Nuevo León with 76, Durango with 63, and Guerrero with 44. All of these states suffer from very high rates of drug-related murders. Over 93% of all murders in Chihuahua are drug-related, compared to 73% in Sinaloa, and about 70% in both Guerrero and Durango. The non-drug-related murder rate for Chihuahua of 9.4 is just above the national average of 8.1.

Yucatán has the lowest murder rate with just 0.5 murders per 100,000, lower than the rate in Canada and about one-tenth that of the USA. Other states with relatively low murder rates (see map) include Querétaro (1.0), Tlaxcala (1.5), Hidalgo (5.0) and Tabasco (5.4). All of these states are relatively free of drug-related violence.

Map of murder rate, 2010

Map of murder rate, 2010. Credit: Tony Burton / Geo-Mexico.

The national murder rate of 17.9 is almost twice the rate for the Federal District (D.F.) which is 9.2 per 100,000. Only about 18% of the murders in the capital city are drug-related. The murder rate in Jalisco of 12.0 is well below the national average, even if it has increased rapidly. Over half the murders in Jalisco in 2010 were drug-war-related. The State of Mexico also has a relatively low murder rate of 7.6 with 30% of murders related to the drug wars.

The main conclusion is that many northern states like Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Nuevo León and Durango are plagued by drug war violence and have very high murder rates. On the other hand, most states in the south and southeast, like Yucatán, Campeche and Tlaxcala are relatively free of drug war violence and historically have had low murder rates. One significant anomaly in the overall pattern appears to be Guerrero which is well to the south but has a high murder rate and a very significant amount of drug violence.

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